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LIST OF PARTIES 
At the time of preparation of this Reply the parties to this action are the same as 
those listed on the caption except as noted below. This appeal only directly involves the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman who was dismissed from the 
action. 
The Defendant Anthony M. Thurber, who is not a party to this appeal, is 
represented by Thomas L. Kay, P.O. Box 45305, Salt Lake City, Utah 04145-0305. 
The Defendant Kenneth A. Okazaki has been voluntarily dismissed from the action 
and is not a party to this appeal. 
Arron F. Jepson, who is not a party to this appeal, is represented by D. Gary 
Christian, City Center I, Suite 330,175 East 400 South 84111-2314. 
Stephen R. Madsen, who is not a party to this appeal, has been added as a 
defendant to the action in the district court but has not yet been served or appeared herein. 
Donald E. Elkins, who is not a party to this appeal, has been added as a defendant 
to the action in the district court and has appeared pro se and also as counsel for the 
partnership of Madsen, Jepson & Elkins which has also been added as a defendant in the 
district court and is not a party to this appeal. Mr. Elkin's address is 60 East 100 South, 
Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and CANDICE 
STEWART, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.; PENELOPE 
DALTON COFFMAN; COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN & WOODS, a professional 
corporation a/k/a as Coffman & Coffman; 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and ARRON 
F. JEPSON, jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
(PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
Defendant-Respondent) 
Certiorari No. 880071 
Category No. 13 
(Case No. 860318-CA in 
Court of Appeals; 
originally No. 860167 
in Utah Supreme Court) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
The above Defendant-Respondent hereby petitions the Utah Supreme Court to 
refuse certiorari to review the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in the above matter 
dated and filed January 12, 1988, appeal No. 860318-CA. 
1. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. The sole issue on appeal is whether 
a shareholder of a law firm organized under the Utah Professional Corporation Act is 
vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of another shareholder of the firm. Petitioners 
seek a certiorari for review of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which upheld the 
decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand County in dismissing Penelope 
Dalton Coffman (Penelope), a shareholder of an incorporated law firm, from the above 
action. The Respondents submit that the decision of the Court of Appeals fully considered 
and addressed the professional aspects of the practice of law, holdings by the courts of 
other States, the legislative history and intent of the Professional Corporation Act, and the 
1 
implications of the its decision in its decision and its review of Petitioners* Petition for 
Rehearing. 
2. REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF 
OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. The Court of Appeals issued its 
written opinion on January 12, 1988. Rehearing was denied by order dated January 27, 
1988. The opinion has reported in 73 Utah Advance Reports at page 119. 
3. STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION OF SUPREME 
COURT IS INVOKED. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for Grand County. The appeal was originally to the Supreme Court (No. 
060167) but was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Review of the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is now sought through Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari. 
(a) The Date Of Entry Of Decision Sought To Be Reviewed: The decision sought to 
be reviewed was dated and entered on January 12, 1988. 
(b) The Date Of The Entry Of Order Respecting Rehearing: The Court of Appeals' 
order denying the Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing was entered on January 27, 1988. 
(c) The Statutory Provision Believed To Confer On Supreme Court Jurisdiction To 
Review The Decision In Question By A Writ Of Certiorari: Section 78-2-2(3) (a) of the 
Utah Code Annotated provides the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over a 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Additionally, Section 78-2-2(2) provides the Supreme 
Court with original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs. See Also Rule 46 and Rule 47 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
4. CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED. 
Utah State Constitution, Article VHI, Section 4 (Effective July 1,1985): 
. . . The supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct 
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
The Utah Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq. 
16-11-3. Purpose of act.-This act shall be so construed 
as to effectuate its general purpose of making available to 
professional persons the benefits of the corporate form for 
the business aspects of their practices while preserving 
the established professional aspects of the personal 
relationship between the professional person and those he 
serves. 
16-11-10. Laws as to professional relationships not 
altered.-This act does not alter any law applicable to the 
relationship between a person rendering professional 
services and a person receiving such services, including 
liability arising out of such professional services. 
16-11-5. Application of Utah Business Corporation Act -
- Conflicts. The Utah Business Corporation Act shall be 
applicable to professional corporations, and they shall 
enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to the 
duties, restrictions and liabilities of other corporations, 
except where inconsistent with this act. This act shall take 
precedence in the event of any conflict with the provisions 
of the Utah Business Corporation Act or other laws. 
Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively 
limiting the lawyers liability to a client for malpractice 
unless permitted by law and the client is independently 
represented in making the agreement... 
Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct: 
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable 
efforts to insure that the firm has in effect measures 
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of professional Conduct. 
(b) . . . A lawyer shall be responsible for another 
lawyer's violations of the Rules of professional Conduct if: 
. . . (2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which 
the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory 
authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct 
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated 
but fails to take reasonable remedial action. 
Comment to Rule 5.1 of Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4 (a), a lawyer does not 
have disciplinary liability for the conduct of partner, 
associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable 
civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a 
question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. 
5. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Nature of the Case 
This is a legal malpractice case. Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
from a final dismissal which dismissed defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman (Penelope) 
from the action brought by the Plaintiffs in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand 
County against several attorneys including defendants Penelope and Aldine J. Coffman, 
Jr. (Aldine). The case was transferred to the Court of Appeals which upheld the district 
court's dismissal of Penelope; and rejected a later Petition for Rehearing. 
Statement of Facts 
At the time the suit was filed, Penelope and Aldine were members of Coffman, 
Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation. Penelope filed a motion to dismiss 
herself as a defendant for failure of plaintiffs to state a cause of action upon which relief 
could be granted. The motion was denied because there were "no facts presented from 
which the Court can find as a matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant, contrary to the 
allegations of the Complaint, had not (sic) personal involvement in the matters alleged." (R. 
30-58). Subsequently Penelope filed a motion to reconsider supported by her affidavit 
(R. 59-61; 70-71) in which she stated: 
2. Affiant is a member of the law firm Coffman, 
Coffman (and) Woods. 
3. The law firm Coffman, Coffman (and) Woods is a 
professional corporation. 
4. Affiant has not at any time undertaken to 
represent (plaintiffs) in an matter. 
5. Affiant has not corresponded at any time with 
the (plaintiffs), or either of them, with regard to any legal 
matter. 
6. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant never 
saw the file, never knew the contents of the file, never 
discussed with any other member of the lawfirm (sic) the 
contents of the file, and cannot contribute any information 
through discovery, having no personal (knowledge) of any 
of the events leading up to the filing of this lawsuit. 
The motion to dismiss was granted. (R. 72-74; 135-137). 
In Judge Bunell's order of dismissal, the trial court stated that the undisputed facts 
showed that Coffman, Coffman and Woods was a P.C. and "although (Penelope), is a 
member of that corporation, she had no personal or professional involvement in the matters 
alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court concluded as a matter of law from those 
undisputed facts that there is no cause of action against (Penelope)." The Court's judgment 
as to Penelope was ordered final pursuant to Rule 54(b) URCP. (R. 144-6). The appeal 
process then commenced, resulting in the opinion of the Court of Appeals upholding the 
trial court's decision. 
It should be noted that the underlying liability lawsuit is proceeding against Aldine 
J. Coffman, Jr., Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation a/k/a as 
Coffman and Coffman. 
ARGUMENT AGAINST ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT CONTAINS NO 
PROVISION FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND NO MEMBER OF 
A CORPORATION CAN BE CHARGED WITH LIABILITY FOR 
THE ACTS OF ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE CORPORATION 
ABSENT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT. 
Penelope D. Coffman and Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. are both members of the 
defendant law firm Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation. Aldine J. 
Coffman has rendered services to the Appellants. Penelope D. Coffman has rendered no 
services to Appellants; nor has she been in anyway involved in the services rendered by 
Aldine J. Coffman. 
The laws governing the members of a professional corporation are found in the 
Utah Professional Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. section 16-11-1 to 16-11-15 (1978). 
The Utah General Partnership Act is not applicable to a professional corporation. 
Appellants cite section 16-11-3 and 16-11-10 from the Professional Corporation 
Act allowing professionals the use of the corporation form for business purposes, while 
not altering the professional relationship between the professional and his client. The 
language of the Statute, however, specifically states that the act "does not alter any law 
applicable to the relationship between a person rendering professional services and a 
person receiving such services, including liability arising out of such professional 
services." (emphasis added) There is no mention of a relationship with or liability of, other 
members of a corporation. The emphasis is on liability of a person rendering professional 
services to a person that receives such services. 
In a case dealing with the issue of vicarious liability among members of a 
professional corporation, the Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
A member of professional legal corporation in Nevada is 
not individually liable for the tortious acts of other 
members of that professional legal corporation unless 
he/she personally participated in those tortious acts. 
Gravson v. Jones. 710 P.2d 76 (Nev. 1985) 
It is a fact that of this case that Penelope D. Coffman did not in any sense of the 
definition personally participate in the representation of the appellants. 18 AM JUR 2d 
Section 27 and 18 AM JUR 2d Section 854 affirm the law that while the liability between 
an attorney and his client remains the same in a professional corporation, vicarious liability 
is not imposed on a shareholder. 
Section 16-11-5 of the Professional Corporation Act reads as follows: 
The Utah Business Corporation Act shall be applicable to 
professional corporations, and they shall enjoy the powers 
of privileges and be subject to the duties, restrictions and 
liabilities of other corporations, except where inconsistent 
with this act. 
The Utah Business Corporation Act, which is applicable to the Utah Professional 
Corporation Act, provides that shareholders are under no obligation to the corporation or its 
creditors other than the obligation to pay full consideration for shares issued. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 16-10-23 (1978). The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled accordingly in 
giving a professional corporation the same powers and privileges that a business 
corporation enjoys. The court states "a professional service corporation enjoys all powers 
and privileges of other corporations, under Colorado law." Network Affiliates v. Robert 
E. Schack. P.A.. 682 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo. App. 1984). 
The general law of corporations provides that corporate officers are jointly and 
severally liable only when two or more join or participate in a wrongful act. Directors are 
not liable for the wrongful acts of their co-directors if they do not connive with them, nor 
* are the executive officers responsible for the neglect of duty, negligence, or misconduct of 
each other in their official relations, without proof of joint participation. 18 B AM JUR 2d 
Section 1719, 1720. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon in Amfac Foods. Inc. v. International 
Systems & Controls Corp.. 294 Or. 94, 654 P.2d 1092 (1982), has provided a general 
interpretation of corporate law in what the Utah Court of Appeals described as a lengthy 
discussion concerning exceptions to shareholder immunity, and described the general rule 
as follows: 
The question of when and under what circumstances a 
shareholder becomes liable for a corporate obligation has 
troubled judges and lawyers for a century or so. Although 
corporate shareholders were not insulated from liability 
for debts of the corporation in common law England, 
shareholder insulation from such liability has been a 
cornerstone of corporate law in the United States since the 
nineteenth century. Virtually every state has a statute 
similar to [Oregon's], which limits a shareholder's 
liability to the cost of the shares held. 
We believe that this court should also follow this general interpretation of corporate 
law. 
POINT n 
The Court of Appeals has thoroughly examined all 
contentions raised by the Petitioner-Appellant including 
Petitioner-Appellant's contention that the Rules of 
Professional Conduct somehow create vicarious liability 
for shareholder attorneys. 
The Court of Appeals, without the matter having been raised in the appellant's or 
respondent's Briefs below has examined the question of whether or not the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1988, has created vicarious liability for 
shareholder attorneys. 
The scope section of the Rules of Professional Conduct contains this statement: 
Violation of a rule should not give rise to a cause of action 
nor should it could create any presumption that a legal duty 
has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide 
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for 
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are 
not designed to be a basis for civil liability. 
Accordingly nothing in the Rules should be deemed to 
augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the 
extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. 
The Court of Appeals went on to review Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct (which were adopted after the facts which gave rise to the lawsuit which is the 
basis of this current appeal) and determined that neither Rule 5.1 nor Rule 8.4 vary from a 
proper interpretation of the Utah Professional Corporation Acts which underlies the basic 
decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals also referred to the comment to 
Rule 5.1 as being "instructive." That comment reads as follows: 
Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not 
have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, 
associate, or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable 
civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a 
question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. 
Thus it seems clear that Petitioner-Appellant's contention that the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility somehow apply to this situation are inaccurate and unfounded. 
6. APPENDIX. An appendix is attached to the Petitioner-Appellant's Petition for 
Certiorari. It contains all items which might otherwise be attached as an appendix to this 
Brief. To avoid duplication this Respondent adopts the contents of Petitioner's Appendix. 
It contains the following: 
Opinion of Court of Appeals. 
Order denying petition for Rehearing 
Affidavit of Penelope Dalton Coffiman 




A writ of certiorari should be denied. 
The Court of Appeals in the trial court decisions are well thought out and have fully 
reviewed the question. The decision of the trial court and the decision of the Court of 
Appeals are in accordance with the law as it exists in the statutes of the State of Utah and as 
it ought to exist. Plaintiffs retain all opportunities for legitimate recompense against the 
attorneys that actually worked on the legal matters in question. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the writ of certiorari should not issue and that 
the decision of the Court of Appeals should be allowed to stand. 
Respectfully submitted this 1$^ day of March, 1988. 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing Respondent's Brief In Opposition To Petition For Certiorari 
this day of March, 1988, by mailing four copies, postage prepaid, to the 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Donald E. Elkins, Pro Se and on 
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